“They combine a mad love of country with an equally mad indifference to life, their own as well as others. They are cunning, unscrupulous, and inspired.”

                                                                                    – Alfred Hitchcock

 

 

W

While narrating his version of the development of Pakistan’s nuclear program on a private T.V. channel recently, Dr. A Q Khan made highly disparaging and totally baseless remarks about the late Mr. Munir Ahmad Khan, Chairman Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), 1972-1991. He described the latter as “incompetent” with a mediocre academic and professional background. He has also failed to explain how could a person with such ‘doubtful’ credentials continue as Chairman of PAEC for 19 years, under diametrically opposed governments and hold important positions in the international nuclear field. A Q Khan, who happens to be a copper metallurgist, appears to be suffering from a state of megalomania, but it seems, he has, of late, lost all sense of proportion.

Mr. Munir Ahmad Khan was a nuclear engineer of international stature with a brilliant academic record. He graduated in Physics and Mathematics from Government College, Lahore in 1946 and won an Academic Roll of Honour.[1] He subsequently obtained a B.Sc in Electrical Engineering in 1949 from Engineering College, Punjab University, Lahore, where he served as an Assistant Professor before being awarded a Fulbright and Rotary International Scholarship in 1951.[2] He thus obtained an M.S in Electrical Engineering from North Carolina State University, USA in 1952 and the proceeded to the Illinois Institute of Technology (IIT) for post-graduate research work till 1956.[3]

While at the IIT, he was elected in 1953 as Member of the Sigma-Xi, Research Society of America for noteworthy achievement in scientific research.[4] His IIT years also led him to work with the Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Company, Milwaukee, U.S.A, and as a system planning engineer with the Commonwealth Edison Company, Chicago- the large power utility in the United States that pioneered the construction of an industrial nuclear power reactor.[5] In 1956, he was selected for the “Atoms for Peace” Program. He entered the international nuclear field after graduating as a nuclear engineer from the Argonne National Laboratory’s International Institute of Nuclear Science and Engineering (IINSE).[6] His practical research experience in nuclear engineering began with work on “Modifications of CP-5 Reactor” as a Research Associate in Argonne’s Nuclear Engineering Division.[7] He then proceeded to work as a Reactor Design Engineer on the “Thermodynamic Design of Japan Research Reactor-2 “in the Reactor Division of AMF-Atomics, Conn. USA. It was this company which designed and built the Pakistan Atomic Research Reactor-1 (PARR) for Pakistan during the 1960s.

As one of the rising generation of gifted and dynamic nuclear engineers, in 1958 he was the first Asian to be selected by the first Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Dr. Sterling Cole, for a technical position in Professional-Grade P5 in the IAEA’s Nuclear Power and Reactors Division.[8] After obtaining the necessary approval of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Malik Feroz Khan Noon,[9] he joined the Agency where he served as Senior Officer, Nuclear Power and Reactor Technology and Application. He eventually rose to become Director of the IAEA’s Reactor Engineering and Fuel Cycle activities, a position held till 1972. He was known in the IAEA as “The Reactor Khan.“[10] He served as a Member of the IAEA Board of Governors for 12 years and as leader of Pakistan’s delegations to 19 IAEA General Conferences. He was also elected Chairman of the IAEA Board of Governors from 1986-87 and was Fellow of the International Nuclear Academy, the American Nuclear Society, Member of the International Consultative Group on Nuclear Energy, and was the first President of Pakistan Nuclear Society.[11]

As a senior IAEA staff member, his major responsibilities included developing and implementing programs in the field of research in reactor utilization in nuclear centres[12]; review of design, construction and operation of demonstration power reactors in USA and Canada (1960-1965); technical and economic assessment of nuclear power reactors; world survey of nuclear power plants for developing countries[13]; construction and operating experience with nuclear reactors; fast breeder reactors and nuclear desalination. He also organized for the IAEA more than 20 international technical and scientific conferences and seminars on heavy water reactors; advanced gas-cooled reactors; plutonium utilization; performance of nuclear power plants; problems and prospects of introducing nuclear power in developing countries; small and medium power reactors, and coordinating programs for research in theoretical estimation of uranium depletion and plutonium build-up in power reactors in the USA, USSR, UK, France and Canada.[14] In 1961, he prepared a technical feasibility study on behalf of the IAEA on small power reactor projects for the United States Atomic Energy Commission.[15]

 

Due to his outstanding competence in the field, he was chosen to lead the first major nuclear power assessment that the IAEA carried out for the United Nations in the Philippines.[16] He also served as Scientific Secretary to the Third and Fourth UN International Geneva Conferences on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in 1964 and 1971 respectively. [17] Earlier, Dr. Homi J. Bhabha of India and Dr. Abdus Salam had served as Scientific Secretaries of these conferences. He was also instrumental in securing necessary support of the IAEA for Dr. Abdus Salam in setting up the International Centre for Theoretical Physics (ICTP) in Trieste, Italy.[18] While at the IAEA, he remained a regular unofficial consultant to PAEC on numerous technical and other matters. Together with the then Chairman of PAEC, Dr. I.H. Usmani, he helped in the establishment of the 5 MW Pakistan Atomic Research Reactors under the Atoms for Peace Program and the 137 MWe Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) under the Colombo Plan.[19]

It should also be noted here, that Dr. A Q Khan had also belittled Dr. Abdus Salam, Pakistan’s only Nobel Laureate. His insinuations against Dr. Salam and his lack of knowledge about the importance of theoretical physics in any bomb program was clearly evident. After all J. Robert Oppenheimer was also theoretical physicist; the American theoretical physicist and professor of physics at the University of California, Berkeley. He is best known for his role as the scientific director of the Manhattan Project, the World War II project that developed the first nuclear weapons, for which he is often referred to as the “father of the atomic bomb”

It was in this backdrop that Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto met him for a fateful meeting in Vienna in October, 1965 in the wake of the September war with India. During this meeting, he briefed the then Pakistani Foreign Minister on all that he knew of India’s fast growing nuclear program as he had visited India’s nuclear facilities in Trombay and both agreed on the inevitable need for Pakistan to acquire nuclear capability.[20] Therefore, Mr. Bhutto arranged a meeting between President Ayub and Munir Ahmad Khan on December 11, 1965 at the Dorchester Hotel. When Munir came out of the meeting, he informed an impatient Bhutto, who was pacing up and down in the lobby that “the President did not agree.” Bhutto instantly remarked, “Don’t worry, our turn will come!”[21] This marked the beginning of an alliance was akin to that of Nehru and Bhabha in India.

Therefore, one of the first steps taken by Mr. Bhutto towards the development of the nuclear program was to summon a meeting of senior scientists and engineers at Multan on January 20, 1972. Prior to this, Bhutto had called Munir Khan from IAEA to prepare a feasibility report on Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure.[22] At the Multan meeting, Mr. Bhutto announced the appointment of Munir Ahmad Khan as the new Chairman of PAEC and made him directly responsible to the Chief Executive. [23]At the inauguration of KANUPP on November, 28, 1972, Mr. Bhutto recalled his association with Munir Ahmad Khan:

“Since 1965, I have been in close touch with you (Chairman PAEC) and we have had many occasions to discuss how atomic energy can help in the development of our country. That is why soon after assuming this office, I not only placed the Atomic Energy Commission under my direct control, but asked you to return to the country and serve the nation.”[24]

Without going into details, from then on, PAEC initiated work on the complete nuclear fuel cycle, and following India’s nuclear test of 1974, on the nuclear weapons program. However, the task confronting Munir Khan and PAEC was herculean by any standard. The total manpower comprising scientists, engineers of various disciplines in PAEC was 283[25] since half the manpower training in the previous decade was Bengali and had left for Bangladesh. The task ahead included the successful commission of KANUPP, and acquiring complete mastery over the nuclear fuel cycle, which provides a country with the option of going for the highly enriched uranium or plutonium or both routes to producing fissile material for an atomic bomb.

Therefore, to build a uranium bomb, through the highly enriched uranium route, a country needs the following plants and facilities:[26]

1. Uranium deposits
2. A uranium mine
3. A uranium mill (for processing uranium ore that usually contains less than 1
   percent uranium into uranium oxide concentrate, or yellowcake).
4. A uranium conversion plant (for purifying yellowcake and converting it into uranium
   hexafluoride (UF6) or uranium tetrachloride (UCl4), the material processed
   in the enrichment plant.
5. An enrichment plant (for enriching the uranium hexafluoride gas or uranium
   tetrachloride in the isotope U–235).
6. A capability for converting the enriched uranium hexafluoride gas or uranium
   tetrachloride into solid uranium oxide or metal.

 

Hence, PAEC under Munir Ahmad Khan established the following infrastructure for developing the HEU route:

 

Development of Enriched Uranium Route for Producing Fissile Material by PAEC: 1972-1981
Process/ Step           Location/Facility         Launched       Completed         Product
Uranium Exploration	Baghalchur, Dera Ghazi Khan	1972	Ongoing	Uranium Ore
Uranium Processing	Baghalchur-1 (BC-1), DG Khan	1975	1978	Yellow Cake/ Uranium Concentrate U308
Uranium Conversion	Chemical Plants Complex, DG Khan	1975	1980	Uranium Oxide U02; Uranium Tetra fluoride UF4; Uranium Hexafluoride Gas, UF6
Uranium Enrichment	Chaklala, Sihala, Kahuta	1974	1980	Enriched Uranium Gas U-235
Uranium Metallurgy	Uranium Metal Laboratory	1977-78	1980-81	Enriched Uranium U-235 Metal

 

Moreover, to build a plutonium bomb, through the plutonium route, a country needs the following plants and facilities:[27]

 

1. Uranium deposits.
2. A uranium mine.
3. A uranium mill (for processing uranium ore containing less than 1 percent
   uranium into uranium oxide concentrate, or yellowcake).
4. A uranium purification plant (to further improve the yellowcake into reactor grade
   uranium dioxide).
5. A fuel fabrication plant (to manufacture the fuel elements placed in the reactor),
   including a capability to fabricate zircaloy or aluminium tubing.
6. A research or power reactor moderated by heavy water or graphite.
7. A heavy-water production plant or a reactor-grade graphite production plant.
8. A reprocessing plant.

 

Hence, PAEC under Munir Ahmad Khan established the following infrastructure for developing the Plutonium route:

 

Development of Plutonium Route for Producing Fissile Material by PAEC: 1972-1997
Process/ Step           Location/Facility         Launched       Completed         Product
Uranium Exploration	Baghalchur, Dera Ghazi Khan	1972	Ongoing	Uranium Ore
Uranium Processing	Baghalchur-1 (BC-1), DG Khan	1975	1978	Yellow Cake/ Uranium Concentrate U308
Uranium Conversion	Chemical Plants Complex, DG Khan	1975	1980	Uranium Oxide U02;
Nuclear Fuel Fabrication	Kundian Nuclear Fuel Complex	1975	1980	Nuclear Fuel Elements for Nuclear Reactors
Plutonium Production Reactor	50 MW Khushab Plutonium Production Reactor, Khushab Nuclear Complex	1985	1997	Weapons-Grade Plutonium-239
Heavy Water Production	Khushab Nuclear Complex	1986	1996	Heavy water for Khushab reactor
Tritium Production	Tritium Production Plant, Khushab Nuclear Complex	1987	1987	Tritium gas for boosting fission (atomic) bombs and producing hydrogen and thermonuclear bombs
Fuel Reprocessing and Plutonium Metallurgy	New Labs, PINSTECH	1973	1981	Separating plutonium from spent nuclear fuel and producing Pu-239 metal

 

These milestones were achieved in 15-20 Directorates of PAEC[28] comprising over 20 labs and projects as Munir Khan recalled in 1999:

“Many sources were tapped after the decision to go nuclear. We were simultaneously working on 20 labs and projects under the administrative control of PAEC, every one the size of Khan Research Laboratories.”[29]

These projects comprised comprising uranium exploration, refining and processing, conversion, and fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities, whose establishment was approved by Mr. Bhutto as part of a long-term comprehensive nuclear plan prepared by Munir Khan in May 1972.[30] With regard to the development of nuclear weapons and its associated infrastructure, Munir Khan recalled:

“While we were building capabilities in the nuclear fuel cycle, we started in parallel the design of a nuclear device, with its trigger mechanism, physics calculations, production of metal, making precision mechanical components, high-speed electronics, diagnostics, and testing facilities. For each one of them, we established different laboratories.”[31]

A Theoretical Physics Group was founded in Dec. 1972 and was tasked with developing the design of the nuclear device,[32] while a Directorate of Technical Development under Mr. Muhammad Hafeez Qureshi was set up in PAEC in March 1974 to coordinate the work of all the specialized groups being set up to work on the development and testing of nuclear weapons.[33] On June 15, 1974, Prime Minster Zulfikar Ali Bhutto directed PAEC to initiate work on the atomic bomb.[34]

Prior to this, Munir Ahmad Khan had called a meeting to begin work on the nuclear device in a meeting held on March 1974 when a brilliant mechanical engineer, Mr. Muhammad Hafeez Qureshi was appointed head of the Wah Group and the Directorate of Technical Development (DTD). The Wah group was later expanded to include chemical, mechanical, explosive, and precision engineers and was tasked to handle implosion hydrodynamics, neutron sources, high explosive testing, triggering mechanism for the device, and precision engineering for the nuclear device.[35] On March 25, 1974, Munir Ahmad Khan, Hafeez Qureshi and Dr. Riazuddin held a meeting with the then head of the Pakistan Ordance Factories, Lt. Gen. Qamar Ali Mirza, to set up a plant to manufacture His Majesty’s Explosive (HMX) for use in the explosive lenses of the proposed implosion-design fission device. The project was codenamed “Research.” [36] The Theoretical Physics Group headed by Dr. Riazuddin had completed the first conceptual and theoretical design of the nuclear device whose report was submitted to Munir Ahmad Khan in December 1976.[37]

Moreover, PAEC had mastered the fuel cycle by 1980 and completed the nuclear test sites at Chaghi and carried out the first cold test of a working nuclear device on March 11, 1983.[38] A second cold test was undertaken shortly afterwards which was witnessed by General K.M. Arif, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, and Munir Ahmad Khan. This was followed by a series of 24 cold tests till the early 1990s wherein different weapon designs were cold tested and their validity was demonstrated when PAEC carried out six nuclear tests on May 28 and 30 at Chaghi and Kharan respectively.[39] Dr. A Q Khan claims to have carried out only one cold test in 1984 and to have informed President Zia in writing. However, PAEC carried out not one but two dozen cold tests, between 1983 and 1990. While recalling the first cold test and the journey to nuclear capability, Munir Khan would later recall in a Speech delivered to honour the Chaghi heroes in 1999:

“While we were building capabilities in the nuclear fuel cycle, we started in parallel the design of a nuclear device, with its trigger mechanism, physics calculations, production of metal, making precision mechanical components, high-speed electronics, diagnostics, and testing facilities. For each one of them, we established different laboratories. In 1980 we completed the tunnels at Chaghi. On March 11, 1983, we successfully conducted our first cold test of a working nuclear device. Dr Ishfaq, Dr Samar Mubarakmand, and many others were there. That evening, I went to General Zia with the news that Pakistan was now ready to make a nuclear device. The team that conducted that test was basically the same that carried out the Chaghi test last year. I also want to put this on record that we conducted this cold test long before the [fissile][40] material was available for the real test.”[41]

The second PAEC cold test in May 1983 was witnessed by General K. M. Arif who acknowledged it and other PAEC cold tests in Deception, thus:

“It was a red-letter day. I can tell you we were all very excited. The tests went perfectly. Pakistan to all intents and purposes now had its bomb. The work of our scientists was nothing short of heroic. From now on there were twenty-four more cold tests to straighten out the triggering mechanism until we got the hang of it exactly.”[42]

All nuclear weapon states typically carry out hundreds of cold and hot tests before the validity of their weapon designs is confirmed. It is only through a sustainable nuclear test program that a country is able to perfect and improve its indigenous nuclear weapon design, and Pakistan followed the same path. Testing is also needed to acquire data on the performance parameters of a particular bomb design, based on which an improved, more efficient and miniaturized bomb design is possible. Nuclear weapon programs are not sustainable on the basis of a single cold test alone, otherwise the United States and other nuclear weapon states like France and Russia, with the most sophisticated simulation and supercomputer technologies would not need to carry out hundreds of nuclear tests, at sea, in the air and underground. That is why PAEC was entrusted with the task of carrying out the Chaghi tests because it had been engaged in nuclear testing and developing new and improved bomb designs based on several cold tests for more than three decades.

If nuclear weapons design, development and testing are child’s play and not very challenging as A Q Khan asserts, then, why does the United States has dedicated three of its main nuclear weapon laboratories, i.e. Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National Labs to nuclear weapon design, development and testing for more than 50 years? How many aspiring states have easily mastered nuclear weapon development know-how and developed the infrastructure for it outside the nuclear weapon states and even those that have mastered the fuel cycle? If nuclear weapon design, development and testing programs are so easy to establish and so less important compared to producing the fissile material, then one must wonder why three out of five Indian nuclear tests failed in May 1998, even though it has vast stocks of plutonium and is producing highly enriched uranium? And theoretical physics is the first step towards designing an indigenous nuclear device. Oppenheimer, who headed the Manhattan Project, too was a theoretical physicist.

With regard to the enriched uranium route to the bomb, it is not a question of putting uranium in the centrifuges from one end and getting ready made fissile material from the other. In producing the fissile materials, A Q Khan was only in charge of the centrifuge project and not the other projects before enrichment, without which the centrifuges would be useless pieces of metal. The scale of the task that goes into making the feedstock from refined and processing uranium can be gauged from the fact that 10,000 tons of uranium has to be mined for one bomb.[43] Then it is refined to 99.9 percent purity[44] and converted into oxide, metal and then the natural uranium hexafluoride gas UF6 of very high purity. It is this uranium gas that is enriched to weapon grade through the centrifuges, and its production involves very complex and dangerous processes needed to produce hydrofluoric acid and other fluorine compounds that are extremely toxic.[45] Without UF6, there can be no enrichment[46] and having a centrifuge plant without tons of UF6 as feed is like having an oil refinery without having a supply of crude oil. As mentioned above, the entire infrastructure for uranium exploration, mining, refining and conversion that produces UF6 was developed and run by PAEC.[47]

Munir Ahmed Khan initiated the uranium enrichment programme of PAEC as Project-706 in October 1974. After examining gaseous diffusion, gas centrifuge, jet nozzle and laser enrichment processes, the gas-centrifuge route to enrichment was selected and a report for the development of a centrifuge enrichment plant was prepared which envisaged its completion by 1979. Within days a feasibility report was prepared in PAEC and a project approval proforma called PC-1 finalised. To maintain secrecy both the feasibility and the PC-1 were handwritten documents. The project proposal was personally hand carried by Munir Ahmed Khan direct to the Prime Minister Bhutto’s hometown of Larkana for his approval. No intermediate offices were involved. Munir Ahmad Khan was driven to the Chaklala Airbase, where a special military aircraft was waiting to take him to Larkana. The same evening he returned to Islamabad with the approval of the Prime Minister.[48]

Munir Khan had obtained the government’s formal approval for funding of various projects for the enriched uranium route, including the Kahuta project, in a meeting with Prime Minister Bhutto on February 15, 1975, and the uranium enrichment programme was formally launched under the name ‘Directorate of Industrial Liaison’ in the barracks of Chaklala airport.[49]

Munir Ahmed Khan had selected the site for Kahuta Enrichment Plant in January 1976, and completed procurement of vital equipment, construction of its civil works, and recruitment of staff for it by 1976.[50] With regard to procurements, it is well documented that materials, equipment and machines critical to jump start the project and also after A Q Khan’s take over of the project from PAEC, were acquired through PAEC’s main procurement agent in Europe, S A Butt, who reported directly to Munir Khan.[51] These procurements included flow-forming and electron beam-welding machines, used in making rotors of centrifuges from aluminium or maraging steel; maraging steel itself, which is the material used in making high-strength rotors of centrifuges, and frequency inverters, used to regulate the power supply to the centrifuges.[52] Under Munir Khan’s guiding hand, Butt would indeed organize Pakistan’s surreptitious network in Europe, running the most successful foray into nuclear espionage since the Soviet Union set out to penetrate the Anglo-American nuclear efforts during and right after World War II.[53]

 

S A Butt also procured high- vacuum valves, for the enrichment project, gasification and solidification units to feed the uranium hexafluoride gas into the centrifuges and then to transform it back into a solid at the end of the centrifuge process. In fact, A Q Khan wished to have his friend and an Indian national, Abdus Salam, as a procurement agent for inverters, who later on emerged as one of the actors in the A Q Khan network. This led to a row between the original supplier who felt he was being cheated, so he blew the whistle and informed a Labor MP of the British Parliament, Frank Allaun, who raised the alarm. Thereafter, all supplies of inverters to Pakistan stopped from Europe.[54]

Interestingly, there is reason to believe that India’s gas-centrifuge design is likely to be a copy of the Pakistan design which appears to be a strange co-incidence,[55] while it has been reported that India’s gas-centrifuge program has also benefited from the A Q Khan network.[56]

Munir Khan had developed vast international contacts which he had cultivated at the IAEA. In 1975 Munir Khan had managed to acquire process engineering designs of centrifuges from his one of his European contacts.[57] By the time A Q Khan joined the uranium enrichment project as Principal Scientific Officer in early 1976, PAEC had already ordered or procured much of the necessary wherewithal to jump-start the project. PAEC had also identified a centrifuge design and gathered abundant soft knowledge for setting up a complete gas-centrifuge enrichment plant based on open source and other literature.[58]

Based on this information, the scientists and engineers working in the enrichment project were able to successfully develop the first prototype centrifuge machines in the pilot centrifuge facility in the barracks of Chaklala airport in Rawalpindi. Subsequently another larger scale pilot centrifuge plant was established at Sihala and the experience gained at these pilot centrifuge plants by scientists and engineers, largely seconded from PAEC, proved to be critical to the success of the large scale centrifuge program at Kahuta. The R&D to develop a prototype centrifuge was carried out at the Chakala site by a team of scientists and engineers, headed by Dr. G D Alam. He along with Anwar Ali, Ijaz Khokhar, Dr. Javed Arshad Mirza and several others had been selected from various establishments, within and outside PAEC before A Q Khan took over the project. There is sufficient evidence to suggest that the designs brought by A Q Khan from Urenco in Holland were incomplete and a lot of indigenous R & D by the scientists and engineers working at the Chakala site led to the successful development of a workable design.[59]

KRL owes its success in producing enriched uranium from UF6 to the hundreds of scientists and engineers, who burnt midnight oil, like their counterparts in PAEC to master all the technologies involved in setting up and running a gas-centrifuge plant. In an apparent breach of national security, A Q Khan reportedly made highly preposterous claims of having received 50 kg of weapon-grade enriched uranium from a friendly country in 1982.[60] If such claims are to be believed, then one must question the way the project was being run by him when he claims to have started production of enriched uranium in the early eighties. More importantly, such claims, if true, amount to leaking state secrets at the cost of potentially damaging Pakistan’s close ties with its friends and allies.

A Q Khan has claimed that the PAEC leadership “was incompetent and did not know anything,” which was why the project was separated from PAEC. But he failed to elaborate as to how hundreds of scientists and engineers in PAEC with the same leadership managed to establish the entire nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear weapon related infrastructure in several other nuclear projects, without having to ask for any “free” hand or carte blanche or break any national laws and work within existing rules?

He also claims that Mr. Bhutto had asked him to not to return to Holland when he arrived in Pakistan in December 1975 as PAEC had not made any progress in the enrichment project and the Prime Minister had asked him to take over the program. However, when A Q Khan joined the project, he was not directly made head of the project but served under the incumbent Project-Director. In fact, the timing of his arrival and decision to stay back in Pakistan had more to do with his bleak career prospects in Holland where he was transferred to a less sensitive section of his employer, FDO, and was running the risk of being exposed. He had been working as a metallurgist in FDO which was not directly involved in the design or development of Urenco centrifuges, but only carried out metallurgical tests on different parts of the experimental centrifuges being built by Urenco. Therefore, he had little choice but to secure his career prospects in Pakistan.[61] He has also often claimed that he was given only Rs. 3000/- salary. In 1976, that was the amount given to a government servant in Grade-20. There were several other scientists and engineers, both in PAEC and KRL who left lucrative career prospects abroad and even their PhD’s to serve Pakistan, but never complained about their salary or the facilities they were getting. For them, devotion to duty and personal sacrifice for the country was worth everything. In addition, A Q Khan has often claimed that only the project that he was heading was the beginning and the end of the nuclear program in Pakistan and was the most important. Everything else was in his view, of marginal significance. If that is so, how many countries in the world have been able to master all the other technologies of the fuel cycle which were not under A Q Khan’s control in Pakistan?

Incidentally, Pakistan’s first indigenous plutonium production reactor project at Khushab was directed by A Q Khan’s predecessor at the Kahuta project, whom he described as a “road-side welder,” and launched by an ‘incompetent’ Munir Khan in 1986 who initiated several nuclear projects from 1973 onwards. These include a reprocessing plant New Labs; a heavy water and a tritium plant at Khushab; a uranium refining plant at Baghalchur; a nuclear materials (Chemical Plants Complex) at Dera Ghazi Khan, which produces the uranium hexafluoride gas as feed for enrichment; the uranium enrichment project; a uranium metal laboratory; a nuclear fuel fabrication complex at Kundian, various labs involved in the design, development, manufacturing and testing of nuclear weapons; an import-oriented nuclear procurement network under the brilliant S A Butt; negotiated the 1986 civil nuclear cooperation agreement with China; secured the 1989 agreement with China for the supply of the 300 MW Chashma nuclear power plant; launched work on several nuclear equipment workshops in 1987; set up a Centre for Nuclear Studies to train indigenous manpower in 1976; expanded PINSTECH and upgraded PARR-1 to 10 MW and set up PARR-2; and established several nuclear medical and agricultural centres; and laid the foundations of the National Development Complex (NDC). [62]

PAEC’s efforts to develop the plutonium route have been consistently ridiculed as a waste of time, effort and resources by those who have little of no understanding why plutonium has been the first choice of every country that has developed nuclear weapons. Plutonium offers considerable advantages over enriched uranium in terms of efficiency, yield and size of nuclear weapons. For a nuclear device that needs only five kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium as critical mass, at least twenty five kilograms of weapon-grade enriched uranium is needed. Moreover, plutonium capability also provides tritium which is used in making thermonuclear weapons and boosted fission weapons. Thus, plutonium enables a country to design and develop substantially miniaturized nuclear warheads that can easily be fitted on to missiles. That is why today Pakistan now appears to have shifted its focus to plutonium production when it began to develop an operational nuclear deterrent capability. That is why two new additional plutonium production reactors at Khushab are now being added to the existing reactor at the same site. However, this again was not possible by a spur of the moment decision. It was the fruit of the vision of Munir Ahmad Khan and the efforts of the scientists and engineers of PAEC for three decades that has provided Pakistan with the ability to produce plutonium and match India in developing advanced compact warheads.

Munir Ahmad Khan was succeeded by Dr. Ishfaq Ahmad in 1991 as Chairman of PAEC who oversaw the completion of several projects launched earlier by Munir Khan. In this regard, Dr. Samar Mubarakmand headed the PAEC team that carried out the 1998 nuclear tests and is also considered as the architect of Pakistan’s missile program as head of the NDC and NESCOM. NDC produced the Shaheen series of solid fuelled missiles, and has also produces much of the liquid fuelled Ghauri missile, which was imported from North Korea and claimed by A Q Khan at the time of its first test as an indigenous product. Later, this project too was handed over to NDC whereas today only the rocket motor of the missile is produced at KRL, while the rest of the missile is produced by NDC/NESCOM.

Dr. Samar Mubarakmand along with hundreds of scientists and engineers served for 19 long years in PAEC under Munir Ahmad Khan. He recalled PAEC’s achievements during this time period in 2007 thus:

“What Munir Ahmad Khan achieved technically for Pakistan and for PAEC, that canvas is a very wide canvas. For one man to have done so much for the country in such a short time, is a truly remarkable feat. He was responsible for setting up Pakistan’s nuclear fuel cycle program, which culminated in providing indigenously manufactured fuel for the Karachi nuclear power plant. In developing the nuclear fuel cycle program, Munir Ahmad Khan established various nuclear facilities throughout the country. The offshoot of this nuclear fuel cycle program half way down the line gave us the uranium gas for Kahuta which we enriched and which was used in our nuclear weapons program. The Kahuta enrichment project itself was envisaged by PAEC, it was a project on which we did a lot of exploratory and research work for separating U-235 and U-238. Then he established the entire infrastructure for the designing, manufacturing and testing of nuclear weapons for the air force, for the missiles, for tactical weapons. He also set up explosive plants, high-speed electronics facilities, precision and mechanical plants for the nuclear weapons program. The Chaghi tunnels were also selected, built and made ready during his time. The Chaghi test site was selected by him in 1975/76 and was ready by 1980. He was a great manager of men and he pushed the people to do all this work and he brought out the best in the scientists and engineers of PAEC. Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure was the result of his hard work and his vision. On the plutonium side, the New Labs reprocessing project was also completed under his leadership. He also began work on the Khushab plutonium production reactor. All this work was envisaged and implemented by one man, Munir Ahmad Khan. This was a colossal work that was done by him from scratch. That is why today Pakistan is a nuclear state and we cannot be blackmailed or threatened by our enemies. He has a tremendous contribution in making Pakistan a nuclear power”[63]

Prime Minister Bhutto’s overthrow in a coup by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977 did not bring about any change in or waiver the alliance of Munir Ahmad Khan and Mr. Bhutto. “While in prison he continued to worry about the progress of our nuclear program. Several times he sent me messages to enquire how various projects were going and repeating his determination to step up this program once he came out,” wrote Munir Ahmad Khan. [64] “Munir would also visit Mr. Bhutto in jail on the pretext of delivering oranges and vitamins and get instructions on completing ongoing projects. It was Munir Khan who informed Mr. Bhutto about the first successful enrichment carried out by the scientists and engineers of Engineering Research Laboratories at the Chakala centrifuge R&D plant in 1978.[65] Nevertheless, President Zia retained his full confidence in Munir Khan’s leadership of the nuclear program and retained him as Chairman PAEC. In a visit to PAEC on November 2, 1986, President Zia wrote in the visitor’s book:

“It has been a matter of great pride and satisfaction to see what all is going on in PAEC. It was heartening to see the progress that has taken place. I congratulate Mr. Munir and his associates for all that they have done. We are proud of their achievements and pray for their success in the future.”[66]

During this visit, President Zia was shown a successful demonstration of the indigenous laser range-finders developed by the laser laboratories of PAEC for the Pakistan Army. These were subsequently marketed through the Al-Technique Corporation (ATCOP).[67] Munir Khan also retained the support of Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo who sanctioned several nuclear infrastructure projects for PAEC during the second half of 1980s.[68] These would enable Pakistan to develop its own plutonium production reactors and acquire indigenous design, fabrication, and manufacturing capability for various nuclear facilities and plants. These infrastructure projects include Heavy Mechanical Complex-3, National Centre for Non-Destructive Testing, Pakistan Welding Institute, and other nuclear equipment workshops.[69]

Following Zia’s death in a plane crash in August, 1988, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s daughter, Benazir came to power. She and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan continued to retain Munir as Chairman PAEC. In a fitting tribute to Munir Khan at his death in 1999, Benazir Bhutto stated:

“Pakistan’s nuclear program will always stand out as a symbol of lasting tribute to the memory of Munir Ahmad Khan. The service rendered by him towards making Pakistan a nuclear-capable country would be long remembered. Munir Ahmad Khan was head of PAEC for nearly two decades during which he helped build the vast nuclear infrastructure and trained thousands of scientists and engineers which eventually brought Pakistan on the nuclear map of the world. Munir Ahmad Khan was chosen for the job by the first elected Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in 1972 for his competence, dedication and commitment. He acquitted himself honorably with the trust reposed in him and in meeting the challenge.”[70]

Benazir had been instructed by her father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to carry messages to and from Munir Ahmad Khan when the former was deposed and imprisoned. She got an assurance from Munir Khan that Pakistan had achieved mastery over the nuclear fuel cycle by 1979. She would later state that “Indeed Munir Ahmad Khan was the long-term chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and considered by many as the real father of Pakistan’s bomb,”[71] who she said was consistently undermined in Pakistan, both as a scientist, and as a human being.

Dr. A Q Khan has also claimed that the 1998 Chaghi tests were carried out only after he wrote a letter to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on May 20, 1998, and had threatened to resign in case the tests were not carried out. He also given the impression that he carried out those tests while, “Dr. Samar and PAEC may have done something there as well.” However, the facts speak otherwise. When India carried out its nuclear tests on May 11 and 13, 1998, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was on a visit to Kazakhstan. Upon hearing the news of India’s tests, Nawaz Sharif contacted the then Chief of Army Staff, General Jehangir Karamat to begin preparations for the nuclear tests.

However, a formal decision was taken in the meetings held in the Defence Committee of the Cabinet wherein PAEC was assigned the task to carry out the tests. It was done because PAEC had been engaged in several cold tests before and had prepared the nuclear test sites and diagnostic facilities and expertise to test nuclear weapons in the previous three decades. The PAEC test team, led by the then Member (Technical), PAEC, Dr. Samar Mubarakmand had already left for the Chaghi and Kharan test sites on May 19^th, 1998. On the verge of the tests, a helicopter carrying the Chairman PAEC, Dr. Ishfaq Ahmad, Lt. General Zulfiqar, head of the Combat Division Directorate in the GHQ, and other guests which included Dr. A Q Khan and some of his associates from KRL. They arrived to the test site a few minutes before the tests and then left after a photo session following the tests. In this regard, Dr. Samar clarified:

“Because atom bombs were developed in PAEC, the entire testing capabilities were there, all the tunnels were developed by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, site was theirs, so it was natural for Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to have given this responsibility to me. And I went to Chaghi with 140 scientists, engineers and technicians and there we conducted these tests. We cannot carry out an atomic test at the spur of the moment, without preparation. I visited Chaghi for the first time in 1981. We installed the instruments in the tunnels, prepared the tunnels according to our requirements, we built atomic bombs during this time also, conducted their cold tests, and when we were asked to carry out these tests, we were given only six days notice. This work cannot be done in six days alone. This was successful in six days only because we were working on and were associated with this program, with the test site, with testing procedures for 20-25 years and we have developed all these processes and procedures ourselves. So technically we had complete mastery over all this work. When these tests were conducted, our team went there on 20th May, and on 28th May, in the early morning, the tunnels were plugged and the preparation for the test was complete and on 28th May, around 3.pm was the time selected for testing. So at that time, at about 2.45 pm, some of our guests arrived to witness the tests, and Dr. Qadeer Khan sahib was also one of them. He came there to see the tests and it was the first visit of his life to Chaghi. And he came there at the invitation of the chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, and he arrived 15 minutes prior to the explosions.”[72]

However, when A Q Khan reached the test site, he asked Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, as to which button had to be pressed for carrying out the tests. According to the then Foreign Minister, Gohar Ayub Khan, A Q Khan asked the Chairman of PAEC, Dr. Ishfaq Ahmad that what would happen to the mountain after the explosion. Dr. Ishfaq replied that the mountain would turn white.[73]

Following the successful nuclear tests at Chaghi, a statement was issued by the Directorate of Technical Development, PAEC, stated:

“The mission has, on the one hand, boosted the morale of the Pakistani nation by giving it an honorable position in the nuclear world, while on the other hand it validated scientific theory, design and previous results from cold tests. This has more than justified the creation and establishment of DTD more than 20 years back. Through these critical years of nuclear device development, the leadership contribution changed hands from Mr. Munir Ahmad Khan to Dr. Ishfaq Ahmad and finally to Dr Samar Mubarakmand (Member Technical). These gifted scientists and engineers along with a highly-dedicated team worked logically and economically to design, produce and test an extremely rugged device for the nation which enabled the Islamic Republic of Pakistan from strength to strength.”[74]

Hence, it was logical that PAEC would carry out the tests as nuclear weapons design, development and testing was its mandate and responsibility. A Q Khan had earlier accused PAEC of procuring sub-standard maraging steel which led to the removal of Sultan Bashir Mahmood as Project-Director of the enrichment project and paved the way for A Q Khan to take over the project from him and subsequently have it separated it from PAEC.[75] Then he accused PAEC of providing him with sub-standard UF6.[76] High level inquiries on both counts proved him wrong.

Pakistan has had to pay a heavy political price for the irresponsible acts and proliferation activities. While many in Pakistan may like to take such allegations of proliferation with a pinch of salt, but it is no less than the former Foreign Minister of Iran, Ali Akbar Velayati who recently gave an interview to an Iranian weekly, Panjereh. He stated that Iran had received the first centrifuges from A Q Khan as far back as 1986, without the knowledge of the Pakistani government.[77] Interestingly, Syrian President Assad claimed to have also rebuffed a similar approach by A Q Khan in 2001.[78] It was Iran and Libya that had originally informed the IAEA about the assistance received from A Q Khan along with all the evidence. Earlier, public interviews and statements made by him, which contradicted Pakistan’s official stance of pursuing a purely peaceful nuclear program, became a catalyst for the introduction of the Pressler Amendment in the mid 1980s, which resulted in the stoppage of U.S. military and economic assistance to Pakistan. If today Pakistan is being denied civil nuclear technology when several other developing countries, including Muslim states like UAE, Libya, and Egypt are being offered the same, along with others that have no nuclear program worth the name, such as Vietnam, it is primarily because of the private and illicit and non-state proliferation activities of A Q Khan. These activities have greatly damaged Pakistan’s image as a responsible nuclear state, even though as a state actor, it has had an impeccable record of nuclear restraint and responsibility.

Yet it is ironic that such irresponsible individuals who have used the nuclear program, leaked state secrets and indulged in illicit export of centrifuges, for personal enrichment and self-promotion continue to be glorified in Pakistan. On the other hand, the unsung heroes who contributed so much to Pakistan’s nuclear program and defense and who exercised restraint and advocated responsibility were labeled as foreign agents. In spite of serving Pakistan with honesty and dedication, they continue to be relegated to the dustbins of history.

Needless to say, A Q Khan on headed on project at Kahuta, whose mandate was confined to one part of producing the fissile material, i.e. enriching uranium gas, and whose team of scientists and engineers was primarily seconded from PAEC and other establishments in the country. It was their hard work, along with almost two dozen project directors in PAEC, responsible for all the other equally critical steps, working under the leadership of Munir Ahmad Khan that enabled Pakistan to become a nuclear state as part of a huge team effort. Everyone played his part very well and let no individual, no matter how popular, distort the facts and claim sole monopoly over achievement.

[1] “Munir Khan Passes Away,” Business Recorder, April 23, 1999.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Dr.M.S. Jillani, “Man of Honor,” The News (Islamabad), June 3, 1999.

[4] “Munir Khan Passes Away,” Business Recorder, April 23, 1999.

[5] “20 Years VIC (1979-1999),” ECHO, Journal of the IAEA Staff- No. 202, pp. 24–25; In Memoriam: Munir Ahmad Khan, IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 41, No. 2, 1999.

[6] “Munir Khan Passes Away,” Business Recorder, April 23, 1999.

[7] In Memoriam: Munir Ahmad Khan, IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 41, No. 2, 1999.

[8] S. A. Hasnain, “Dr. I.H. Usmani and the Early Days of PAEC,” The Nucleus, Vol.42, Nos. 1-2 (2005), p. 19.

[9] Munir Ahmad Khan’s Interview with Urdu Digest, October, 1981.

[10] “20 Years VIC (1979-1999),” ECHO, Journal of the IAEA Staff- No. 202, pp. 24–25; In Memoriam: Munir Ahmad Khan, IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 41, No. 2, 1999; In Memoriam: Munir Ahmad Khan, IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 41, No. 2, 1999

[11] In Memoriam: Munir Ahmad Khan, IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 41, No. 2, 1999.

[12] http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull052/05205002024.pdf

[13] http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull143/14304700208.pdf

[14] http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull031/03104700308.pdf

[15] Munir A. Khan and P. Augustine, “Small Power Reactor Projects of USAEC,” TID-8538 (Reactor Technology), GC(V)/INF/41, International Atomic Energy Agency, September, 1961.

[16] “20 Years VIC (1979-1999),” ECHO, Journal of the IAEA Staff- No. 202, pp. 24–25.

[17] ICTP News, 1999-Munir Ahmad Khan. https://portal.ictp.it/portal.ictp.it/pio/words/news/1999/news_1999_May_03.news

[18] Ibid.

[19] Munir Ahmad Khan, Interview with Urdu Digest, October, 1981.

[20] S.K. Pasha, “Solar Energy and the Guests at KANUPP Opening,” Morning News (Karachi), November 29, 1972; Farhatullah Babar, “Bhutto’s footprints on nuclear Pakistan”, The News, (Islamabad), April 4, 2006.

[21] Farhatullah Babar, “Bhutto’s footprints on nuclear Pakistan”, The News, (Islamabad) April 4, 2006.

[22] Shahid-ur-Rehman, Long Road To Chagai, (Islamabad: 1999, Print Wise Publications), pp. 16-17.

[23] Munir Ahmad Khan,” Bhutto and the Nuclear Program of Pakistan,” The Muslim (Islamabad), April 4, 1995.

[24] S.K. Pasha, “Solar Energy and the Guests at KANUPP Opening,” Morning News (Karachi), November 29, 1972.

[25] Munir Ahmad Khan’s Speech, Chaghi Medal Award Ceremony, Pakistan Nuclear Society, March 20, 1999, Islamabad.

[26] Rodney W. Jones and Mark G. McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998, “Appendix J: Manufacturing Nuclear Weapons,” (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998).

[27] Rodney W. Jones and Mark G. McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998, “Appendix J: Manufacturing Nuclear Weapons,” (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998).

[28] Samar Mubarakmand, “ A Science Odyssey: Pakistan’s Nuclear Emergence,” Speech delivered at Khwarzimic Science Society, Centre of Excellence in Solid State Physics, Punjab University, Lahore, November 30, 1998.

[29] Shahid-ur-Rahman, Long Road to Chaghi, (Islamabad: Print Wise Publications, 1999), p. 74.

[30] Munir Ahmad Khan’s Speech, Chaghi Medal Award Ceremony, Pakistan Nuclear Society, March 20, 1999, Islamabad.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Shahid-ur-Rehman, Long Road To Chagai, (Islamabad: 1999, Print Wise Publication), pp.38-39.

[33] Rai Muhammad Saleh Azam, “When Mountains Move- The Story of Chagai”, Defence Journal, June 2000.

[34] Shahid-ur-Rehman, Long Road To Chagai, (Islamabad: 1999, Print Wise Publications), pp. 43-45.

[35] Ibid, p. 41.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid, p. 75.

[38] Munir Ahmad Khan’s Speech, Chaghi Medal Award Ceremony, Pakistan Nuclear Society, March 20, 1999, Islamabad;

[39] Rai Muhammad Saleh Azam, “When Mountains Move- The Story of Chagai,” Defence Journal, June 2000.

[40] In this case highly enriched uranium.

[41] Munir Ahmad Khan’s Speech, Chaghi Medal Award Ceremony, Pakistan Nuclear Society, March 20, 1999, Islamabad.

[42] Adrian Levy & Catherine Scott Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States and the Global Nuclear Weapons Conspiracy (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2007), p. 96.

 

[43] Samar Mubarakmand, “ A Science Odyssey: Pakistan’s Nuclear Emergence,” Speech delivered at Khwarzimic Science Society, Centre of Excellence in Solid State Physics, Punjab University, Lahore, November 30, 1998.

[44] Munir Ahmad Khan, “How Pakistan Made Nuclear Fuel”, The Nation, (Islamabad) February 7 and 9, 1998.

[45] Farhatullah Babar, “Apportioning Credit for the Bomb,” The News (Islamabad), June 21, 1998.

[46] Shahid-ur-Rehman, Long Road To Chagai, (Islamabad: 1999, Print Wise Publication), p. 67.

[47] Samar Mubarakmand, “ A Science Odyssey: Pakistan’s Nuclear Emergence,” Speech delivered at Khwarzimic Science Society, Centre of Excellence in Solid State Physics, Punjab University, Lahore, November 30, 1998.

[48] Farhatullah Babar, “Apportioning Credit for the Bomb,” The News (Islamabad), June 21, 1998.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid’; “Pakistan Became a Nuclear State in 1983- Dr. Samar,” The Nation (Islamabad), May 2, 2003.

[51] Steve Weismann and Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb (New York: Times Books, 1981), p. 182.

[52] Farhatullah Babar, “Washing Nuclear Linen in Public,” The Muslim, September, 27, 1990.

[53] Steve Weismann and Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb (New York: Times Books, 1981), pp. 47-48.

[54] Dr. G D Alam interview with Assas and Lashkar, June 12, 1998

[55] Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire (New York: Free Press, 206), p. 293.

[56] David Albright and Susan Basu, “India’s Gas Centrifuge Program: Stopping Illicit Procurement and the Leakage of Technical Centrifuge Know-How,” Institute of Science and International Security, May 10, 2006.

[57] Mark Hibbs, “Pakistan Told the Netherlands It Had Italian Centrifuge Design,” Nucleonics Week, September, 22, 2005.

[58] Farhatullah Babar, “Washing Nuclear Linen in Public,” The Muslim, September, 27, 1990; David Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies (New York: Free Press, 2010), p.29.

[59] Dr. G D Alam interview with Assas and Lashkar, June 12, 1998. Also see David Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies (New York: Free Press, 2010), p. 34.

[60] R. Jeffery Smith and Joby Warrick, “A Nuclear Power’s Act of Proliferation,” Washington Post, November 13, 2009.

[61] Steve Weismann and Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb (New York: Times Books, 1981), p. 180;

David Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies (New York: Free Press, 2010), p. 29.

[62] M A Chaudhri, “Pakistan’s Nuclear History: Separating Myth from Reality,” Defence Journal, May 2006.

[63] Dr. Samar Mubarakmand Speech delivered at Munir Ahmad Khan Memorial Reference, Islamabad, April 29, 2007.

[64] Munir Ahmad Khan,” Bhutto and the Nuclear Program of Pakistan,” The Muslim (Islamabad), April 4, 1995; Farhatullah Babar, “Bhutto’s footprints on nuclear Pakistan,” The News (Islamabad), April 4, 2006.

[65] Adrian Levy & Catherine Scott Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States and the Global Nuclear Weapons Conspiracy (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2007), p. 52.

[66] PINSTECH Silver Jubilee Technical Report- 1965-1990.

[67] I.H. Qureshi, “Development of Physical Sciences Program at PINSTECH,” The Nucleus, Vol. 42, Nos. 1-2 (2005), p. 44.

[68] M. Amjad Pervez, “Heavy Manufacturing Facilities of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission,” The Nucleus, Vol. 42, Nos.1-2 (2005).

[69] Ibid.

[70] “Benazir Bhutto condoles Munir’s demise,” Business Recorder (Karachi), April 4, 1999.

[71] ^ http://nucnews.net/nucnews/2004nn/0404nn/040413nn.htm#025

[72] Dr. Samar Mubarakmand’s Interview with Geo TV, March 5, 2004.

[73] Tariq Butt, “Pakistan would have attacked India in 1998,” The News (Islamabad), April 18, 2009.

[74] “Thursday’s N-tests measured 5.0 on Richter scale”, The News (Islamabad), May 31, 1998.

[75] Shahid-ur-Rehman, Long Road to Chagai, (Islamabad: 1999, Print Wise Publication), p. 53.

[76] Ibid, p. 73.

[77] http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/36788306/ns/world_news-mideastn_africa/

[78] “Syria spurned atom smuggler approach in 2001: Assad,” Daily Times, December 20, 2007.